Starting from an example of the Allies' decision to feint at Calais and attack Normandy on D-Day, this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies. Allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and rational players' responses to it yields a sensible account of lying via costless, noiseless messages. In some leading cases, the model has generically unique pure-strategy sequential equilibria, in which rational players exploit boundedly rational players, but are not themselves fooled. In others, the model has generically essentially unique mixed-strategy sequential equilibria, in which rational players' strategies protect all players from exploitation. (JEL C72, D72, D80) Lord, what fools these mortals be! -Puck, A Midsummer Night's Dream, Act 3
You may fool all the people some of the time; you can even fool some of the people all the time; but you can't fool all of the people all the time.
-Abraham Lincoln Now give Barnum his due.
-John Conlisk (2001) Lying for strategic advantage about planned actions, or intentions, is a common feature of economic and political as well as military life. Such lying frequently takes the extreme form of active misrepresentation, as opposed to less than full, honest disclosure. Examples range from the University of California's three consecutive "last chance" voluntary early retirement incentive programs in the early 1990's; to ex-President George Bush's regrettably memo-rable 1988 campaign promise, "Read my lips: no new taxes"; the nearly universal practice of lying about planned currency devaluations; Nathan Rothschild's pretense of having received early news of a British defeat at Waterloo; Hitler's 1939 nonaggression pact with Stalin; and the U.S. Department of Defense's short-lived (but, remarkably, publicly acknowledged) Office of Strategic Influence (James Dao and Eric Schmitt, 2002) . 1 In other cases, the effects of active misrepresentation are duplicated by tacit exploitation of widespread misperceptions, as in accelerationist monetary policy; periodic but unpredictable investment tax credits, or regularizations of the status of illegal immigrants; the failure to disclose known product safety hazards; and deceptive accounting practices in the private or the public sector. 2 These examples share two common features.
1 Roland Benabou and Guy Laroque (1992) give several examples concerning lying to manipulate financial markets, including the possibly apocryphal story of Rothschild's pretense, which allegedly allowed him to make large clandestine purchases of British government securities at depressed prices. Examples in international politics are easy to find, and it is probably no accident that there is a board game called Diplomacy, in which success depends on forming unenforceable agreements with other players and then being the first to break them. 2 See, for example, Paul Krugman's (2001) discussion of the current Bush administration's use of "creative" accounting to make the 2001 tax cut appear feasible without dipping into the Social Security surplus. Krugman's New York Times columns provide many other examples of lying by public or corporate officials.
All involve misrepresentation via agreements, statements, or nonstatements that in themselves have little or no direct costs. And all involve situations in which the parties have predominantly conflicting interests, so that successful deception benefits the deceiver only at the expense of the deceived. Nonetheless, the misrepresentation often succeeds. In fact, in many of the examples the public has so completely internalized the logic of misrepresentation that criticism of the gullibility of those deceived is as common as criticism of the misrepresentation itself. 3 Theory lags behind the public's intuition. The examples' common features suggest that, to a first approximation, they can be modeled as communication via costless messages ("cheap talk") in a zero-sum two-person game. In such a model, however, costless messages must be ignored in equilibrium: If one player could benefit by responding to the other's message, his response would hurt the other player, who would therefore do better to make his message uninformative. Thus, in equilibrium no information is conveyed by costless messages, but neither is anyone fooled by them. 4 This result is appealing in its simplicity, but it leaves us with no systematic way to think about a ubiquitous phenomenon with important consequences. This paper proposes a tractable characterization of bounded strategic rationality in a leading class of zero-sum two-person communication games. The characterization allows a complete analysis of the interaction between possibly rational or boundedly rational senders and receivers, which gives a sensible account of misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies.
My analysis is inspired in part by Kenneth Hendricks and R. Preston McAfee's (2002;  henceforth "HM") analysis of misrepresentation of intentions via what they call "feints" or "inverted signaling." HM's primary interest, like mine, is in economic and political applications; but they motivate their analysis by Operation Fortitude, the Allies' successful attempt to mislead the Germans about their intention to land in Normandy rather than the Pas de Calais (the obvious choice ex ante) on D-Day, June 6, 1944, and I will follow them in this. 5 Their model is a zero-sum two-person game. First the attacker chooses (possibly randomly) between two possible locations and allocates a fixed budget of force between them. Next, the defender privately observes a binary signal whose probability distribution depends on the attacker's allocation, and allocates (possibly randomly) his own budget of force between the two locations. The attack location and players' force allocations then determine their payoffs. The attacker's allocation is like a noisy message to the defender; but as in other models of costly signaling, its large direct payoff implications sometimes allow equilibria in which it is not ignored. HM assume that the payoff function and the conditional probability distribution of the signal are both symmetric across locations. They show, under plausible additional assumptions, that equilibrium in their game must involve some attempt by the attacker to misrepresent his intentions (allocating force to both locations with positive probability) and that his attempt succeeds (inducing the defender to allocate force to both locations with positive probability). For, if the defender ignored his observation of the signal, the attacker would assign all of his force to his intended attack location; but if the defender anticipated this, the attacker would prefer to allocate some force to the other location.
HM identify equilibria in their model in two 3 Mike Royko's (1988) prescient view of Bush's "Read my lips" promise is an entertaining example. An official who does not lie about his country's plan to devalue its currency risks being removed from office, if not institutionalized. Other examples are explicitly covered by proverbs such as "All's fair in love and war." 4 See Crawford and Joel Sobel's (1982) and Joseph Farrell's (1993) analyses of strategic communication of private information and intentions. Crawford and Sobel's equilibria have no active misrepresentation, only intentional vagueness, taking the extreme form of no transmission if the Sender's and Receiver's preferences differ enough to make the game effectively zero-sum; Farrell coined the term "babbling" for such equilibria. Farrell and Matthew Rabin (1996) and Crawford (1998) survey the theory. 5 The deception was so successful that the Germans kept 19 divisions in Calais for several critical days after D-Day. HM summarize the history; see also Gordon Harrison (1951, especially Appendix A) and Anthony Kemp (1994) . HM also give several examples of economic and political misrepresentation, in which firms distort their exploration or bidding strategies to mislead competitors, political candidates campaign in areas they believe are unimportant to divert their opponents' efforts from areas they consider crucial, and so on. cases, distinguished by the signal's informativeness. When the signal is not very informative, they identify "full-defense" equilibria, in which the attacker deterministically allocates most of his force to one attack location but randomizes the location itself, and the defender allocates all of his own force deterministically, to the location the signal suggests is more likely to be attacked. When the signal is more informative, they identify "split-defense" equilibria, in which the attacker randomizes his allocation and attack location in such a way that the defender can draw no inference from the signal, and the defender also randomizes his allocation. In these equilibria, with positive probability the attacker allocates more than half his force to the location he does not attack. HM also obtain intriguing comparative statics results, showing that when the signal is not very informative, a reduction in noise hurts the attacker; but that when it is more informative, a reduction in noise benefits the attacker.
HM stress that their explanation of misrepresentation depends on the noisiness of the signal: "With perfect observability, feints differ from the standard analysis in inconsequential ways. In particular, were the Germans to observe the actual allocation of allied forces, it would not have been possible for the Allies to fool the Germans. Thus, imperfect observation is a critical element for modeling feints."
HM's analysis makes significant progress in understanding the phenomenon of misrepresentation, but it has three troubling aspects. I shall describe them from the point of view of Operation Fortitude, although they are equally troubling in other applications.
First, the cost to the Allies of faking the preparations for an invasion of Calais was small compared to that of the preparations for the actual invasion of Normandy, hence more like cheap talk than HM's identification of feints with sizeable fractions (sometimes more than half) of the attacker's force would suggest. The Germans knew as well as the Allies that it was feasible to fake, or conceal, invasion preparations at no great cost. In a standard equilibrium analysis, they would then rationally ignore both the faked evidence that the attack would be at Calais and the lack of evidence that it would be at Normandy. But they did not-and Allied planners did not expect them to, with anything like certainty.
Second, HM's analysis does not reflect the asymmetry between Normandy and Calais that is arguably the most salient feature of Operation Fortitude. 6 Why not feint at Normandy and attack at Calais instead, particularly if the deception has a fair chance of success? Allied planners rejected Calais in favor of Normandy early in their planning, mainly (but not entirely) because the proximity to England that made it the obvious attack location was also obvious to the Germans, who were expected to defend it so heavily that on balance, Normandy would be preferable (Harrison, 1951) . Neither Allied planners' choice of Normandy nor the fact that they did not explicitly randomize it is inconsistent with HM's equilibria per se, because they assign positive probabilities to both attack locations and in a mixed-strategy equilibrium in beliefs, a player need not bear any uncertainty about his own decision (Robert Aumann and Adam Brandenburger, 1995) . But Allied planners were not indifferent between the locations, and an explanation that treats their choice as an accidental feature of the history may miss something important.
Finally, an analysis of equilibrium in a game without precedent-of which Operation Fortitude and D-Day are perhaps the quintessential example-implicitly rests on the assumption that players' rationality and beliefs are at least mutual knowledge (Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995, Theorem A) . These assumptions are more than usually strained in HM's model, whose equilibria involve a delicate balance of wholly or partly mixed strategies that depend on the details of the signal distribution. This paper shows that allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality yields a sensible account of misrepresentation of intentions in a simpler game, and with costless and noiseless messages. The model and analysis fully reflect the low message costs, the importance of payoff asymmetry across actions, and the difficulty of justifying a delicate equilibrium analysis of a game without precedent just noted.
The model is based on the class of zero-sum two-person perturbed Matching Pennies games in Figure 1 . Two players, a Sender (analogous to the Allies) and a Receiver, choose simultaneously between two pure actions, U for Up (analogous to attacking at Calais) or D for Down for the Sender and L for Left (analogous to defending Normandy) and R for Right for the Receiver. I assume throughout that a Ͼ 1, which corresponds to the lesser difficulty of an unanticipated invasion of Calais. Before playing this underlying game, the Sender sends the Receiver a costless, nonbinding, noiseless message, u or d, about his intended action, with u (d) representing action U (D) in a commonly understood language (Farrell, 1993) . Players then choose their actions simultaneously. The structure of the game is common knowledge. 7 In a standard equilibrium analysis of this game, in any equilibrium (subgame perfect or not) the Sender's message must be uninformative, in that the probability that he plays U conditional on his message is independent of the message; and the Receiver must ignore it, in the sense that the probability that he plays L is independent of the Sender's message. 8 The underlying game must therefore be played according to its unique mixedstrategy equilibrium, in which the Sender plays U with probability 1/(1 ϩ a) and the Receiver plays L with probability 1/(1 ϩ a), with respective expected payoffs a/(1 ϩ a) and Ϫa/(1 ϩ a). 9 Thus, communication is ineffective and misrepresentation is unsuccessful.
The closest precedents for a nonequilibrium analysis of such games are Farrell (1988) and Rabin (1994) , who study preplay communication about intentions via cheap talk, mainly in games whose players have substantial common interests, using extended notions of rationalizability. 10 My model is similar in spirit, but it relaxes the equilibrium assumption in a way that imposes more structure on behavior. I assume that the Sender's and the Receiver's roles in the above game are filled by players chosen randomly from separate distributions, each assigning positive prior probability to certain boundedly rational or Mortal decision rules, or types, as well as to a Sophisticated type. The players do not observe each other's types; but the structure of the game, including the type distributions, is common knowledge. 11 The analysis is otherwise completely standard. 7 These games differ from HM's in having costless and noiseless messages, separate from the attacker's force allocation; simultaneous, zero-one allocations of force to locations; and a payoff asymmetry across actions. Because each side's forces were actually somewhat dispersed, the discrete force allocations in the present model should be thought of as representing principal attack or defense locations. 8 The Sender can make his message uninformative either by always sending the same message or by randomizing his message independently of his action. 9 This equilibrium illustrates a strategic principle noted by John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1953 [first edition 1944 (!) ], pp. 175-76): Counterintuitively, the Sender's probability of playing U is (like the Receiver's probability of playing L) a decreasing function of a. Thus, in this equilibrium, the Allies are more likely to attack Normandy and the Germans are more likely to defend Calais. But for plausible values of a (say, a Յ 1.5), the probability that, ex post, the Allies attack Normandy and the Germans defend Calais, is a 2 /(1 ϩ a) 2 Յ 0.36, so this explanation of the history is unlikely as well as accidental. Crawford and Dennis E. Smallwood (1984) analyze the comparative statics of payoff changes in general two-person zero-sum games with mixed-strategy equilibria, identifying the general principle that underlies this result.
10 See also Miguel Costa-Gomes (2002), who extends Rabin's analysis to interpret experimental data. 11 Thus the model adopts a view of human nature close to Lincoln's, which is more nuanced and arguably more realistic than Puck's. The idea of behavioral types has a long history in game theory, going back to David Kreps and Robert Wilson's (1982) and Paul Milgrom and John Roberts' (1982) analyses of Selten's Chain Store Paradox. Dilip Abreu and Rajiv Sethi (2001) provide an overview and an interesting application to bargaining. However, this and most subsequent work on behavioral types has focused on the limit of sequential equilibria as the prior probability of behavioral types approaches zero, which often differ discontinuously from sequential equilibria when the prior probability is zero. In my analysis, by contrast, sequential equilibrium normally varies continuously with the prior probabilities of Mortal types, and the interest of the analysis depends on those probabilities being nonnegligible. My analysis also differs in deriving Mortals' behavior directly from the structure of the communication game, in a way similar in spirit to Philip Reny's (1992) notion of explicable equilibrium, which models "trembles" via "complete theories." FIGURE 1. THE UNDERLYING GAME Sophisticated players satisfy the usual mutual knowledge of beliefs and rationality assumptions with respect to each other, and can use their knowledge of the structure to predict the probability distributions of Mortal players' strategies. Thus, the Sophisticated type represents the ideal of a fully strategically rational player in this setting.
Mortal players can be thought of as maximizing expected payoffs, if desired, but the beliefs about other players' strategies that rationalize their behavior generally differ from equilibrium beliefs. Instead they use step-by-step procedures of a kind that are empirically plausible in communication games, which generically determine unique, pure strategies but avoid simultaneous determination of the kind used to define equilibrium. In the words of Reinhard Selten (1998, p. 433) :
Basic concepts in game theory are often circular in the sense that they are based on definitions by implicit properties ... . Boundedly, [sic] rational strategic reasoning seems to avoid circular concepts. It directly results in a procedure by which a problem solution is found. Each step of the procedure is simple, even if many case distinctions by simple criteria may have to be made.
Because Mortals' strategies are determined independently of each other's and Sophisticated players' strategies, they can be treated as exogenous, and the analysis can focus on a reduced game between the possible Sophisticated players in each role. 12 In the reduced game, Sophisticated players' strategy choices weigh the responses of Sophisticated opponents against those of Mortal opponents. The possibility of Mortal opponents fundamentally alters the game from Sophisticated players' point of view. The reduced game is no longer zero-sum, because a Mortal oppo-nent's payoff may differ from a Sophisticated opponent's. Its messages are no longer cheap talk, in that a Sophisticated Sender's message directly influences his expected payoff via Mortal Receivers' responses. Finally, the reduced game has incomplete information; and although a Sender's message is nominally about his intentions, it conveys information to a Sophisticated Receiver about his type, and only indirectly about his intentions. These differences allow the analysis to yield more insight into misrepresentation than the standard analysis.
Sequential equilibrium in the reduced game is determined by the prior probability distribution of Mortal players' behavior. The key aspects of this distribution are the probabilities that the Sender is Mortal and lies, or is Mortal and tells the truth; that the Receiver is Mortal and believes, or inverts, the Sender's message; and the actions chosen by each kind of Mortal player in the underlying game. I lump together Mortal Senders who lie, or tell the truth, as the types Liars and Truthtellers, and Mortal Receivers who believe, or invert, the Sender's message as the types Believers and Inverters.
As explained in Section I, many plausible boundedly rational Sender decision rules effectively assume that their attempts to misrepresent will succeed. They therefore respond to the payoff advantage (a Ͼ 1) of U against L over D against R by sending a message meant to induce the Receiver to play L (d for Liars; u for Truthtellers) and then playing U on the equilibrium path. I assume that all Mortal Senders behave this way, which greatly simplifies the analysis without significantly distorting its conclusions.
Given this assumption, the model allows a simple characterization of sequential equilibrium. It is shown in Section II that when the probabilities of Sophisticated Sender and Receiver types are relatively high, there is a generically unique or essentially unique sequential equilibrium in mixed strategies, similar to the babbling message followed by mixed-strategy equilibrium in the underlying game of the standard analysis. In such an equilibrium, Sophisticated Senders' and Receivers' mixed strategies fully offset each other's gains from exploiting Mortal players, Sophisticated players in each role have the same expected payoffs as their Mortal counterparts, and all players' expected payoffs are exactly as in the standard analysis. Thus, not only does sequential equilibrium vary continuously with the type probabilities, most of the standard analysis's conclusions are unaffected by increases in the probabilities of Mortal types from zero to moderate levels.
By contrast, when the probabilities of Sophisticated Sender and Receiver types are relatively low, there is a generically unique sequential equilibrium in pure strategies. 13 In such an equilibrium, a Sophisticated Receiver can perfectly predict a Sophisticated Sender's action, and vice versa. Thus, their communication is "disciplined," as in Farrell and Robert Gibbons (1989) ; but here the discipline comes from the implicit presence of Sophisticated players' Mortal alter egos rather than real other players.
In this case, interest centers on when a Sophisticated Sender "fools" a Sophisticated Receiver in equilibrium, either playing U while the Receiver plays L or playing D while the Receiver plays R. A Sophisticated Sender has the ability to fool a Sophisticated Receiver whenever the prior probability of one Mortal Sender type is high enough, by pooling with that type's message. When the probability of a Sophisticated Sender is low enough and the probability of a Believer is in an intermediate range, there is a "Fortitude" sequential equilibrium in which a Sophisticated Sender sends u but plays Dfeinting at Calais and attacking Normandyand both a Sophisticated Receiver and a Believer play R-defending Calais. 14 However, assuming that Mortal Senders play U on the equilibrium path, in any pure-strategy sequential equilibrium a Sophisticated Receiver plays R following either message. Thus, there are no "reverse-Fortitude" equilibria in which a Sophisticated Receiver defends Normandy but a Sophisticated Sender attacks Calais. 15 This explanation of Operation Fortitude works if both Allies and Germans are Sophisticated, and so does not require postulating an unexplained difference in behavior. It is also less subtle, and perhaps therefore more credible, than HM's explanation: Sophisticated Allied planners (or Mortal planners who make a point of lying to Germans) conceal their preparations for invading Normandy and fake preparations for invading Calais, knowing that the cost of faking is low; that the Germans may be the type of Mortal who can be fooled this way; and that even Sophisticated Germans prefer to defend Calais. Mortal Germans who believe the Allies' messages are fooled because they are too literalminded (or perhaps too clever) to see through the deception. 16 Sophisticated Germans see the possibility of deception, but still prefer to defend Calais because they think the Allies are probably Mortal, and they prefer ex ante to be "fooled" at Normandy by Sophisticated Allies over being "fooled" at Calais by both types of Mortal Allies.
Sophisticated players' sequential equilibrium strategies, pure or mixed, depend only on the payoffs and parameters that reflect simple, portable facts about behavior that could be learned in many games, even if imperfectly analogous to the present one. This is important for applications, particularly those as unprecedented as Operation Fortitude. And in the model's purestrategy sequential equilibria, Sophisticated players' strategies are their unique extensiveform rationalizable strategies, identifiable by at most three steps of iterated conditional dominance (Makoto Shimoji and Joel Watson, 1998) .
With regard to welfare, Sophisticated players in either role do at least as well in equilibrium as their Mortal counterparts, by definition. In the mixed-strategy sequential equilibria that arise when the probabilities of a Sophisticated Sender and Receiver are both relatively high, in each role Sophisticated and Mortal players have identical expected payoffs: Perhaps surprisingly, the prevalence of Sophisticated players fully protects Mortal players from exploitation. By contrast, in pure-strategy sequential equilibria (and in the other mixed-strategy sequential equilibria), Sophisticated players in either role have strictly higher payoffs than their Mortal counterparts. Their advantage in such equilibria comes from their ability to avoid being fooled (except by choice, when it is the lesser of two evils) and their ability to choose which type(s) of opponent to fool.
These results suggest that an adaptive analysis of the dynamics of the type distribution, in the style of Conlisk (2001) , would show that Sophisticated and Mortal players can coexist in long-run equilibrium whether or not Sophisticated players have higher costs, justifying the assumptions about the type probabilities maintained here.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the behavior of Mortal players and the details of constructing the reduced game. Section II characterizes the model's sequential equilibria, showing how they depend on the payoffs and the type distribution. Section III compares Mortal and Sophisticated Sender and Receiver types' equilibrium welfares and briefly discusses an adaptive model of the evolution of the type distribution. Section IV discusses related work, and Section V is the conclusion.
I. The Model
In this section, I motivate the assumptions about the behavior of Mortal players and discuss the details of constructing the reduced game between Sophisticated players. Such rules find strong empirical support in experiments with communication games (Andreas Blume et al., 2001) , and closely resemble rules that find strong support in other game experiments (Dale Stahl and Paul Wilson, 1995; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001) . They also play a prominent role in the classical literature on deception, from Sun Tzu, who advocates W1 in The Art of War (c. 400 -320 B.C.; quoted in Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig, 1981) , continuing through Erving Goffman (1969) , who uses W0 and S0 as the foundation of a richer taxonomy of decision rules. 18 Note that, with the exception of S0, the Receiver decision rules can all be viewed as outguessing simple models of the Sender, and so effectively assume that the Sender's attempts to 17 I assume for convenience that Credible Senders play u, U, D rather than d, U, D, even though both strategies are truthful and both yield the Sender the same payoff, 0, if his message is always believed. Credible Senders could be given a strict preference for u, U, D by slightly perturbing the underlying game's payoffs. 18 Lowell Thomas (1924) recounts an intriguing example of a feint by General Edmund Allenby and Colonel T. E. Lawrence in which types depend on positions in social networks: "... Lawrence also started the rumour through the Arab army that Emir Feisal's host intended to launch its main attack against Deraa railway junction between Amman and Damascus. 'As a matter of fact,' Lawrence remarked, 'we had every intention of attacking Deraa, but we spread the rumour so far and wide that the Turks refused to believe it. Then in deadly secrecy we confided to a chosen few in the inner circle that we really were going to concentrate all of our forces against Amman. But we were not.' This 'secret,' of course, leaked out and was betrayed to the Turks, who immediately shifted the greater part of their forces to the vicinity of Amman, exactly as Allenby and Lawrence had planned." 
inverts (b.r. to W3) L ,R misrepresent will fail. Similarly, except for W0, the Sender decision rules can all be viewed as outguessing simple models of the Receiver, and so effectively assume that their attempts to misrepresent will succeed. As a result, the Sender rules all respond to the payoff advantage (a Ͼ 1) of U against L over D against R by sending a message meant to induce the Receiver to play L, and then playing U on the equilibrium path. Both of these features are typical of simple step-by-step procedures, which tend to be too simple to reflect the danger of playing U in the perturbed Matching Pennies game, in which equilibrium inherently involves "implicit properties" (Selten, 1998, p. 433 ). This is not inevitable, but it is a challenge to find simple, uncontrived rules that avoid the trap.
In the analysis, I stylize this tendency by assuming that all Mortal Senders expect their attempts to misrepresent to succeed, and therefore send a message meant to induce the Receiver to play L, and then play U on the equilibrium path. 19 Liars therefore send message d and play U on the equilibrium path, but would play D if they sent message u. They include all of Table 1 After receiving a message for which a Sophisticated Sender's strategy specifies playing U with probability 1, a Sophisticated Receiver's best response is R (because all Mortal Senders also play U). Otherwise, his best response may depend on his posterior probability or belief, z, that the Sender is Sophisticated. If x is the message and y is a Sophisticated Sender's probability of sending message u, a Sophisticated Receiver's belief is z ϵ f( x, y), where f(u, y) ϵ ys s /(s t ϩ ys s ) and f(d, y) ϵ (1 Ϫ y)s s /[(1 Ϫ y)s s ϩ s l ], by Bayes' Rule. Figure 2 gives the payoff matrix of the reduced game between a Sophisticated Sender and Receiver, using these observations to derive Sophisticated players' expected payoffs. (Greek capital letters identify strategy combinations that are pure-strategy equilibria of the reduced game, sequential or not, for some parameter configurations.) If, for example, a Sophisticated Sender's strategy is u, U, D and a Sophisticated Receiver's strategy is R, L, the former plays U and the latter plays R when he receives message u. Thus, all Sender types play U, Inverters play L, Believers and Sophisticated Receivers play R, a Sophisticated Sender's expected payoff is ar i , and a Sophisticated Receiver's is 0. If, instead, a Sophisticated Sender's strategy is u, D, U and a Sophisticated Receiver's strategy is L, R, the former plays D and the latter plays L when he receives message u. All other Sender types play U, Inverters play L, and Believers 19 The continuity of equilibria implies that the analysis is robust to small deviations from this assumption. 20 That such types can be lumped together in this way illustrates a kind of paradox of bounded strategic rationality, in that, with a finite number of possibilities for guessing and outguessing, it is as bad to be too much wilier, or more skeptical, than one's opponent as to be too much less wily, or skeptical. By contrast, in Conlisk's (2001) model Tricksters always find a way to outwit Suckers, just as Puck does with mortals. play R. A Sophisticated Sender's expected payoff is r b ; and a Sophisticated Receiver's, whose posterior belief that the Sender is Mortal is 1 Ϫ s s /(s t ϩ s s ) ϵ s t /(s t ϩ s s ), is Ϫas t /(s t ϩ s s ). Figure 3 (Panels A and B) gives the payoff matrices of the reduced "u" and "d" games following messages u and d, as determined by a Sophisticated Receiver's belief, z ϵ f( x, y).
Because messages have no direct costs, the only difference between type populations in which the frequencies of Mortal Senders and Receivers are interchanged is in which message fools which type. Figure 2 reflects this symmetry, in that simultaneous permutations of the probabilities of Liars and Truthtellers, and of Believers and Inverters, yield an equivalent game. Figure 3 's u and d games are identical except for interchanged roles of r i and r b , because they differ only in whether Inverters or Believers are fooled.
II. Analysis
In this section I characterize the sequential equilibria of the reduced game, as functions of the payoff a and the type probabilities. 21 Table  2 and Figure 4 give the sequential equilibria for the various possible parameter configurations.
Proposition 1, proved in the Appendix, is the basic characterization result: PROPOSITION 1: Unless either r b Ͼ r i , ar b ϩ r i Ͻ 1, and s s Ͼ as t , or r i Ͼ r b , ar i ϩ r b Ͻ 1, and s s Ͼ as l , the reduced game has a generically unique sequential equilibrium in pure strategies, in which a Sophisticated Sender's and Receiver's strategies are as given in Table 2 and Figure 4 . In these sequential 21 Sequential equilibrium combines the standard notion of sequential rationality with consistency restrictions on players' beliefs. Because both messages always have positive probability, zero-probability updating is not an issue, and any notion that captures the idea of sequential rationality would yield the same results. (1 ϩ a) ; and a Sophisticated Receiver's equilibrium expected payoff is Ϫa/(1 ϩ a). 22 In case (i), if r b Ͼ 1/(1 ϩ a) , there is a unique mixed-strategy sequential equilibrium, in which a Sophisticated Sender sends message u with probability y ϭ s t /as s and plays D in the u game and U in the d game; a Sophisticated Receiver plays R in the u game and R in the d game; a Sophisticated Sender's expected payoff is (s t /as s )(r b ϩ r s ) ϩ (1 Ϫ s t /as s )ar b ; and a Sophisticated Receiver's expected payoff is Ϫs t /[a(1 ϩ a) s s ]. 1/(1 ϩ a) 1/(1 ϩ a) , and s s Ͻ as t (⌫ m ) m, D, U; R, R iff r b Ͼ r i , ar b ϩ r i Ͻ 1, r b Ͼ 1/(1 ϩ a) , and s s Ͼ as t (⌫Ј) u, D, D; R, R iff r b Ͼ r i , ar b ϩ r i Ͻ 1, r b Ͻ 1/(1 ϩ a) , and s s Ͻ as t [true iff r i Ͻ r b Ͻ 1/(1 ϩ a) ] 1/(1 ϩ a) , and s s Ͼ as t (B) u, U, U; R, R iff r i Ͼ r b , ar i ϩ r b Ͼ 1, and r b Ͼ 1/(1 ϩ a) 1/(1 ϩ a) , and s s Ͻ as l (Z m ) m, U, D; R, R iff r i Ͼ r b , ar i ϩ r b Ͻ 1, r i Ͼ 1/(1 ϩ a) , and s s Ͼ as l (ZЈ) d, D, D; R, R iff r i Ͼ r b , ar i ϩ r b Ͻ 1, r i Ͻ 1/(1 ϩ a) , and s s Ͻ as l [true iff r b Ͻ r i Ͻ 1/(1 ϩ a) ] 1/(1 ϩ a) , and s s Ͼ as l Note: In the table m refers to a probability mixture over messages u and d, and M u (M d ) refers to the player's part of the relevant mixed-strategy equilibrium in the u (d) game; both are described precisely in Proposition 1. In case (ii) , where r i Ͼ r b , ar i ϩ r b Ͻ 1, and s s Ͼ as l , the conclusions are the same as in case (i) , but with the roles of r i and r b , and of s l and s t , reversed.
The asymmetry across actions of Proposition 1's conclusion that a Sophisticated Receiver's strategy is R, R in all pure-strategy sequential equilibria is an important part of the model's explanation of Operation Fortitude. The conclusion is trivial if the probability of a Mortal Sender is high enough to make R a dominant strategy in the underlying game; but, somewhat surprisingly, it remains valid even if the probability is not high enough, as long as the game has a pure-strategy sequential equilibrium. It superficially resembles the babbling equilibrium of the standard analysis, but it actually stems from the assumption that Mortal Senders play U. 23 In a pure-strategy sequential equilibrium, a Sophisticated Sender's deviation from his equilibrium message "proves" to a Sophisticated Receiver that the Sender is Mortal, making R the Receiver's best response off the equilibrium path. If a Sophisticated Sender plays U on the equilibrium path, the conclusion is immediate. If, instead, a Sophisticated Sender plays D on the equilibrium path while a Sophisticated Receiver plays L, the Sophisticated Sender's message fools only the most frequent type of Mortal Receiver, at a payoff gain of 1 per unit of probability. But such a Sophisticated Sender could reverse his message and action, again fooling the most frequent type of Mortal Receiver, but now at a payoff gain of a Ͼ 1 per unit, a contradiction.
Given that a Sophisticated Receiver plays R, R, the rest of Proposition 1's conclusions concerning pure-strategy equilibria are straightforward. Because a Sophisticated Sender cannot truly fool a Sophisticated Receiver in equilibrium, whichever action he chooses in the underlying game, it is always best to send the message that fools whichever type of Mortal Receiver, Believer or Inverter, is more likely. The only remaining choice is whether to play U or D, when, with the optimal message, the former action fools max{r b , r i } Mortal Receivers at a gain of a per unit and the latter fools them at a gain of 1 per unit, but also "fools" r s Sophisticated Receivers. Simple algebra reduces this question to whether a max{r b , r i } ϩ min{r b , r i } Ͼ 1 or Ͻ 1.
It is clear from Figure 4 that the model's pure-strategy sequential equilibria avoid the perverse comparative statics of equilibrium mixed strategies with respect to a in the standard analysis, noted in footnote 9. Within the region that supports a given pure-strategy equilibrium, a does not affect Mortal or Sophisticated players' strategies at all. However, as intuition suggests, increasing a always enlarges the set of type frequencies that support equilibria in which a Sophisticated Sender's equilibrium action is U (B, BЈ, E, or EЈ).
Proposition 1's conclusions concerning mixed-strategy equilibria in case (i) 
, are straightforward extensions of the standard analysis to parameter configurations in which the probabilities of a Sophisticated Sender and Receiver are both high. But in case (i) if r b Ͼ 1/(1 ϩ a) (⌫ m ), or case (ii) if r i Ͼ 1/(1 ϩ a) (Z m ), the model has unique mixedstrategy sequential equilibria with a different character, in which randomization is confined to a Sophisticated Sender's message, and serves to "punish" a Sophisticated Receiver for deviating from R, R in a way that relaxes the s s Յ as t or s s Յ as l constraint whose violation prevents a Sophisticated Sender from realizing the higher expected payoff of equilibrium ⌫ or Z. These equilibria are otherwise similar to the purestrategy equilibria ⌫ or Z for adjoining parameter configurations, and converge to them as the relevant population parameters converge.
In both kinds of mixed-strategy equilibrium, players' strategies are determined by simple, portable behavioral parameters as for pure-strategy equilibria; but both share some of the delicacy of HM's equilibria, and of mixed-strategy equilibria more generally.
To assess more fully the model's ability to explain Operation Fortitude, reconsider the sequential equilibria ⌫ or ⌫Ј in which a Sophisticated Sender feints at Calais and attacks at Normandy, while a Sophisticated Receiver defends Calais. In general, the conditions for those equilibria are r b Ͼ r i , ar b ϩ r i Ͻ 1, and s s Ͻ as t . r b Ͼ r i reflects a preponderance of Believers over Inverters that is plausible, so I assume it. 24 Given this, suppose r b ϭ cr i and s l ϭ cs t for some constant c. Then, ⌫ or ⌫Ј is sequential iff r b Ͻ c/(ac ϩ 1) and s s Ͻ a/(1 ϩ a ϩ c) . When a ϭ 1.4, as in Figure 4 , and c ϭ 3, which seem plausible values, these conditions reduce to r b Ͻ 0.58 and s s Ͻ 0.26, reasonable parameter ranges. 25
III. Welfare Analysis
This section conducts a welfare analysis of the model's sequential equilibria, comparing the expected payoffs of Mortal and Sophisticated types. The comparisons use actual rather than anticipated expected payoffs for Mortal types, whose beliefs may be incorrect. I focus on cases in which r b Ͼ r i ; transposition yields the results when r i Ͼ r b . Table 3 lists all types' messages, actions, and expected payoffs on the possible sequential equilibrium paths, extending Figure 2's payoff calculations and Proposition 1's characterization of equilibrium behavior from Sophisticated to Mortal players. 26 The table shows that Sophisticated players in either role have expected payoffs at least as high as their Mortal counterparts'. This much is true by definition, because Sophisticated players can always mimic Mortal players; but in pure-strategy equilibria, Sophisticated players have strictly higher payoffs. Sophisticated Senders' advantage over Mortal Senders in these equilibria stems from their ability to avoid being fooled and to choose which type(s) to fool. Sophisticated Receivers' advantage comes from their ability to avoid being fooled, or to choose the least costly way to be "fooled."
Sophisticated players enjoy a smaller advantage in the mixed-strategy sequential equilibria ⌫ m or Z m , but for similar reasons. By contrast, in the mixed-strategy sequential equilibria ⌫Ј m 24 If r i Ͼ r b the sequential equilibria Z or ZЈ would duplicate the outcomes of ⌫ or ⌫Ј, with inverted messages. 25 Higher values of a make the first condition more stringent and the second less stringent. The plausibility of the ⌫ or ⌫Ј equilibria may be further enhanced by the human tendency to overrate one's own strategic sophistication relative to others'. Further, ⌫ m is behaviorally similar to ⌫, and so one might relax ⌫'s restriction on s s , at the cost of a random prediction of a Sophisticated Sender's message. The closest the model can come to a reverse-Fortitude sequential equilibrium, in which a Sophisticated Sender attacks at Calais while a Sophisticated Receiver defends Normandy, is in the sequential equilibria E or EЈ, in which a Sophisticated Sender feints at Normandy and attacks Calais, fooling Believers but not Sophisticated Receivers. The conditions for those equilibria are r b Ͼ r i and ar b ϩ r i Ͼ 1. Again assuming r b Ͼ r i and r b ϭ cr i , E or EЈ is sequential iff r b Ͼ c/(ac ϩ 1). When a ϭ 1.4 and c ϭ 3, this condition reduces to r b Ͼ 0.58, which seems less realistic than the conjunction of r b Ͻ 0.58 and s s Ͻ 0.26. 26 Table 3 sometimes combines the equilibrium-path outcomes of more than one equilibrium, to save space. The listed actions may therefore differ from Sophisticated players' sequential equilibrium strategies. 
IV. Related Work
This section briefly discusses related work. Sobel (1985) was the first to propose an equilibrium explanation of lying, studying an "enemy" Sender's incentives in repeated interaction to build and eventually exploit a reputation for being a "friend" of the Receiver's. His analysis focused on communication of private information in settings with asymmetric information about the Sender's preferences, as opposed to the asymmetric information about the Sender's and the Receiver's strategic thinking analyzed here. Benabou and Laroque (1992) extended Sobel's analysis to allow the Sender to have noisy private information, and used it to analyze the use of inside information to manipulate financial markets. 28 Farrell and Gibbons' (1989) analysis of costless communication to multiple audiences has already been mentioned. Glenn Loury (1994) provides a different perspective on the issues that arise with multiple audiences.
Finally, Conlisk (2001) studied the adaptive dynamics of selection in favor of types with higher payoffs among a different set of types, Trickster, Avoider, and Sucker, taking the "fooling technology" as given (footnote 20). He showed that if those types have successively lower costs they can coexist in long-run equilibrium, proving (in a special case) P. T. Barnum's dictum, "There's a sucker born every minute, and two to take him." Section III's welfare analysis could be used to conduct an analysis of adaptive dynamics like Conlisk's. I conjecture that unless Sophisticated players have higher costs, their payoff advantage in pure-strategy (and some mixed-strategy) equilibria will lead their relative frequencies to grow until the population frequencies enter the region of mixed-strategy equilibria in which all types' expected payoffs are equal (region ⌫Ј-ZЈ in Figure 4 ). (Because Liars do better than Truthtellers when there are more Believers than Inverters, and Believers do better than Inverters when there are more Truthtellers than Liars, there is also a tendency for the dynamics to approach the diagonal in Figure 4 .) The population can then be expected to drift among a continuum of neutral steady states in the ⌫Ј-ZЈ region. 29 If Sophisticated players have slightly higher costs, the population frequencies should approach and remain near the boundary of the ⌫Ј-ZЈ region, without entering it. 30 This would also allow Sophisticated and Mortal players to coexist in long-run equilibrium, justifying the assumptions about the type frequencies maintained here.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, I have proposed a way to model active misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies. The model focuses on the strategic interaction between rational and boundedly rational types of players in a game of conflicting interests, with one-sided preplay communication via costless messages.
Allowing for the possibility of bounded rationality yields a sensible account of lying via costless, noiseless messages, and simplifies many aspects of the analysis of games with communication. For many parameter configurations, in contrast to a standard analysis of communication with conflicting interests, the model has generically unique pure-strategy sequential equilibria, which can be identified by iterated elimination of conditionally dominated strategies. In these equilibria rational players exploit boundedly rational players, but are not 27 Here, Truthtellers' and Liars' strategies are both in the support of a Sophisticated Sender's mixed strategy. 28 See also John Morgan and Philip Stocken's (2003) analysis of financial analysts' incentives to reveal private information to investors, and some of the references cited there. 29 I am grateful to Kang-Oh Yi for this observation. 30 This conclusion is not immediate because the present model has two player populations and a more complex pattern of payoff advantages than Conlisk's model. There, taking cost differences into account, in pairwise interactions Tricksters do better than Suckers, Suckers better than Avoiders, and Avoiders better than Tricksters. Here, with equal costs for Mortals and higher costs for Sophisticated players, Sophisticated players may do better or worse than their Mortal counterparts, depending on the parameters and the costs. themselves fooled. This part of the analysis suggests an explanation of the Allies' decision to feint at Calais and attack at Normandy on D-Day, and of why the Allies did not instead feint at Normandy and attack at Calais.
For other parameter configurations, the model has generically unique or essentially unique mixed-strategy sequential equilibria, in which rational players' equilibrium strategies offset each other's gains from fooling boundedly rational players, completely protecting them from exploitation. Those equilibria share some of the delicacy of mixed-strategy equilibria in other games.
In all of the model's equilibria, players' strategies are determined by simple, portable behavioral parameters. Thus the analysis reduce strategic questions like those that underlie Operation Fortitude to empirical questions about behavioral parameters, which can be discussed using evidence from imperfectly analogous settings. 31 I hope that the methods for modeling bounded strategic rationality presented here can elucidate strategic communication when players' interests are not in conflict, and can also be used to create behaviorally realistic models of strategic behavior in other applications.
APPENDIX

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
I begin by characterizing the equilibria of the u and d games (Figure 3) , as determined by a Sophisticated Receiver's belief, z, that the Sender is Sophisticated.
LEMMA 1: The u game has a generically unique equilibrium as follows:
LEMMA 2: Unless either r b Ͼ r i , ar b ϩ r i Ͻ 1, and s s Ͼ as t , or r i Ͼ r b , ar i ϩ r b Ͻ 1, and s s Ͼ as l , the reduced game has a generically unique sequential equilibrium in pure strategies, in which a Sophisticated Sender's and Receiver's strategies are as given in Table 2 and Figure 4 . In these sequential equilibria, a Sophisticated Receiver's strategy is R, R; and a Sophisticated Sender plays U (D) on the equilibrium path iff a max{r b , r i } ϩ min{r b , r i } Ͼ (Ͻ) 1 and sends message d (u) iff r b Ͼ (Ͻ) r i . Sophisticated players' sequential equilibrium strategies are their unique extensive-form rationalizable strategies, identifiable by at most three steps of iterated conditional dominance.
PROOF:
Because all types have positive prior probability and Liars and Truthtellers send different messages, all messages have positive probability in equilibrium. Further, in any pure-strategy sequential equilibrium, a Sophisticated Sender's message is pooled with either Liars' or Truthtellers' message, so a deviation to the other message makes z ϭ 0. In the u or d game that follows such a deviation, R is a conditionally dominant strategy for a Sophisticated Receiver; and a Sophisticated Sender's unique best response is U (D) iff r i Ͼ (Ͻ) 1/(1 ϩ a) in the u game and U (D) iff r b Ͼ (Ͻ) 1/(1 ϩ a) in the d game by Lemma 1.
All that remains is to identify the strategy combinations in Figure 2 that are equilibria for some parameter configurations, use these conditions to check which configurations make them sequential, and check the other conclusions of the lemma.
Identifying the configurations by the Greek capital letters in Figure 2 , ⌬ and ⌬Ј are equilibria iff r b Ͼ 1 ⁄2 . For ⌬ to be sequential, U, L must be an equilibrium in the u game when z ϭ 0, which is never true. For ⌬Ј to be sequential, D, L must be an equilibrium in the u game when z ϭ 0, which is never true. Thus neither ⌬ nor ⌬Ј is ever sequential. Similarly, A and AЈ are equilibria iff r i Ͼ 1 ⁄2 , but neither A nor AЈ is ever sequential. E and EЈ are equilibria iff r b Ͼ r i and ar b Ͼ r b ϩ r s , which reduces to ar b ϩ r i Ͼ 1. For E to be sequential, U, R must be an equilibrium in the u game when z ϭ 0, which is true iff r i Ͼ  1/(1 ϩ a) . Thus E is sequential iff r b Ͼ r i , ar b ϩ r i Ͼ 1, and r i Ͼ 1/(1 ϩ a) , where the second condition is implied by the first and third. For EЈ to be sequential, D, R must be an equilibrium in the u game when z ϭ 0, which is true iff r i Ͻ 1/(1 ϩ a) . Thus EЈ is sequential iff r b Ͼ r i , ar b ϩ r i Ͼ 1, and r i Ͻ 1/(1 ϩ a) . Similarly, B and BЈ are equilibria iff r i Ͼ r b and ar i ϩ r b Ͼ 1; B is sequential iff r i Ͼ r b , ar i ϩ r b Ͼ 1, and r b Ͼ 1/(1 ϩ a) , where the second condition is implied by the first and third; and BЈ is sequential iff r i Ͼ r b , ar i ϩ r b Ͼ 1, and r b Ͻ 1/(1 ϩ a) .
⌫ and ⌫Ј are equilibria iff s s Ͻ as t , r b Ͼ r i , and r b ϩ r s Ͼ ar b , which reduces to ar b ϩ r i Ͻ 1. For ⌫ to be sequential, U, R must be an equilibrium in the d game when z ϭ 0, which is true iff r b Ͼ 1/(1 ϩ a) . Thus ⌫ is sequential iff s s Ͻ as t , r b Ͼ r i , ar b ϩ r i Ͻ 1, and r b Ͼ 1/(1 ϩ a). For ⌫Ј to be sequential, D, R must be an equilibrium in the d game when z ϭ 0, which is true iff r b Ͻ 1/(1 ϩ a). Thus ⌫Ј is sequential iff s s Ͻ as t , r b Ͼ r i , ar b ϩ r i Ͻ 1, and r b Ͻ 1/(1 ϩ a) , where the second condition is implied by the first and third. Similarly, Z and ZЈ are equilibria iff s s Ͻ as l , r i Ͼ r b , and ar i ϩ r b Ͻ 1; Z is sequential iff s s Ͻ as l , r i Ͼ r b , ar i ϩ r b Ͻ 1, where the second condition is implied by the first and third; and r i Ͼ 1/(1 ϩ a). and ZЈ is sequential iff s s Ͻ as l , r i Ͼ r b , ar i ϩ r b Ͻ 1, and r i Ͻ 1/(1 ϩ a) .
In each case, the generic uniqueness of Sophisticated players' best responses can be verified by iterated conditional dominance, starting with the pure-strategy equilibria in the 2 ϫ 2 u and d games. The remaining conclusions are easily verified by inspection.
LEMMA 3: If either (i) r b Ͼ r i , ar b ϩ r i Ͻ 1, and s s Ͼ as t ; or (ii) r i Ͼ r b , ar i ϩ r b Ͻ 1, and s s Ͼ as l , the reduced game has a generically unique or essentially unique mixedstrategy sequential equilibrium, in which a Sophisticated Sender's and Receiver's strategies are as given in Table 2 and Figure 4 . In case (i), if r b Ͻ 1/(1 ϩ a) , there are multiple mixed-strategy sequential equilibria, in each of which a Sophisticated Sender sends message u with probability y, where as t /s s Ͻ y Ͻ 1 Ϫ as l /s s . Each of these y values leads to u and d games with different, unique mixed-strategy equilibria. In these equilibria a Sophisticated Sender plays U with probability 1 Ϫ a/(1 ϩ a) [ /(1 ϩ a) ; and a Sophisticated Receiver's equilibrium expected payoff is Ϫa/(1 ϩ a) .
In case (i), if r b Ͼ 1/(1 ϩ a) , there is a unique mixed-strategy sequential equilibrium, in which a Sophisticated Sender sends message u with probability y ϭ s t /as s and plays D in the u game and U in the d game; a Sophisticated Receiver plays R in the u game and the d game; a Sophisticated Sender's expected payoff is (s t / as s )(r b ϩ r s ) ϩ (1 Ϫ s t /as s )ar b , and a Sophisticated Receiver's expected payoff is Ϫs t / [a(1 ϩ a)s s ].
In case (ii) , where r i Ͼ r b , ar i ϩ r b Ͻ 1, and s s Ͼ as l , the conclusions are the same as in case (i) , but with the roles of r i and r b , and of s l and s t , reversed.
In case (i), if r b Ͻ 1/(1 ϩ a) , and if z Ͻ a/(1 ϩ a) in either the u or the d game, D, R would be its unique equilibrium. But then, in this case, a Sophisticated Sender would prefer to send the message that led to that game with probability 1, and with z ϭ 0, players would also have pure best responses in the other game by Lemma 1. But the proof of Lemma 2 shows that there are no pure-strategy sequential equilibria in this case when s s Ͼ as t . If, instead, z Ͼ a/(1 ϩ a) in each game, in this case the u and d games have unique mixed-strategy equilibria as characterized in Lemma 1. ys s /(s t ϩ ys s ) Ͼ a/(1 ϩ a) and (1 Ϫ y)s s /[s l ϩ (1 Ϫ y)s s ] Ͼ a/(1 ϩ a) provided that as t /s s Ͻ y Ͻ 1 Ϫ as l /s s , which is always feasible when s s Ͼ as t . Because a Sophisticated Sender's expected payoff is a/(1 ϩ a) in either the u or the d game, he is willing to randomize with any such y. The rest of the proof in this case is a straightforward translation of the conclusions of Lemma 1.
In case (i), if r b Ͼ 1/(1 ϩ a) , the d game always has a unique pure-strategy equilibrium U, R, with expected payoff ar b for a Sophisticated Sender. If y ϭ 0, the u game would be off the equilibrium path, so message u would make z ϭ 0, and the u game would have a unique pure-strategy equilibrium D, R, with payoff r b ϩ r s Ͼ ar b for a Sophisticated Sender. Thus there cannot be an equilibrium in this case with y ϭ 0. Similarly, if y ϭ 1, iff r b Ͻ a/(1 ϩ a) the u game has a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium, with z ϭ s s /(s t ϩ s s ) Ͼ a/(1 ϩ a) and expected payoff a/(1 ϩ a) Ͻ ar b for a Sophisticated Sender. If y ϭ 1 and r b Ͼ a/(1 ϩ a) , the u game has a unique pure-strategy equilibrium, D, L, and expected payoff r b Ͻ ar b for a Sophisticated Sender. Thus there cannot be an equilibrium with y ϭ 1. Because r b ϩ r s Ͼ ar b Ͼ a/(1 ϩ a) in this case, a Sophisticated Sender's optimal choice of y maximizes y(r b ϩ r s ) ϩ (1 Ϫ y)ar b subject to the constraint that D, R is an equilibrium in the u game, which is true in this case iff z ϭ ys s /(s t ϩ ys s ) Յ a/ (1 ϩ a) , or equivalently y Յ s t /as s . Thus, a Sophisticated Sender's optimal message strategy is y ϭ s t /as s . 33 The rest of the proof follows directly from Lemma 1, noting that a Lemma 3 completes the proof of Proposition 1.
